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Abstract 
This paper compares two trading mechanisms in a dealer market with several securities, asymmetric 
information and imperfect competition. These two market structures differ in the information 
received by market makers. While in the first of them they observe the order flows of all assets 
when setting prices, in the second setting market makers are assumed to observe the order flow 
corresponding to one security. In order to make this comparison, we analyze several market 
indicators such as the volatility and the informativeness of equilibrium prices and the unconditional 
expected profits of insiders under both regimes. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most surprising phenomena in asset markets over the past decade has 
been the proliferation of new markets. This growth leads to the competition between them 
and, hence, it is natural to wonder which market designs will survive. 
In this paper, we turn our attention to a specific issue in market performance, which 
is transparency. O'Hara (1995) defines it as the ability of market participants to observe the 
information in the trading process. She emphasizes that, despite of the simplicity of this 
definition, this issue is complex. One difficulty is to make concrete what information is 
observable. A second difficulty is to determine who can observe the information. 
Building on this insight, we compare some properties of two trading mechanisms in 
the context of a static, imperfectly competitive multi-asset market. More precisely, we 
contrast two distinct multi-security extensions of the Kyle'S (1985) framework purposed by 
Caballe and Krishnan (1994) and Bossaerts (1993). These two papers differ in the 
information observable by market makers. Whereas in the first work they observe the order 
flows of all the assets when they set prices, in the second one market makers can only 
observe the order flow of the security that they price. Notice that Caball6 and Krishnan 
present an integrated financial market, while Bossaerts models a segmented market. This 
terminology is adopted since one can interpret that in the first paper a unique market for all 
the securities is considered, whereas in the second one there is one market for each 
security. 
In order to compare the two trading mechanisms, we contrast some market 
indicators such as the volatility and the informativeness of equilibrium prices and the 
unconditional expected profits of insiders under both regimes. Concerning the volatility of 
prices, we show that the variances of the equilibrium prices of each security under both 
regimes are equal. In relation to the informational content of prices, we prove that the 
equilibrium price vector corresponding to the segmented trading mechanism is more 
informative about the payoff of an asset than the corresponding to the integrated one. With 
regard to the unconditional expected profits of insiders, we show that they are smaller in 
the integrated trading mechanism than in the segmented one. 
Previous studies have examined how differences in information about the market 
itself influence the performance of the market. Madhavan (1992) analyzes how 
transparency affects to market behavior and viability. Biais (1993) examines how the 
transparency of the quotes affects spreads when there is no private information. Pagano and 
Roell (1996) compare the price formation in several trading systems, which differ in the 
degree of transparency. They analyze how transparency affects the trading costs for 
uninformed traders. Other papers (see, for instance, Roell (1990), Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1991) and Fishman and Longstaff (1992)) focus on the notion of transparency referred to 
the degree to which agents can trade anonymously. Our concept of transparency is related 
to market orders rather than to identities of agents. The present paper differs from all the 
previous ones in the fact that we examine a multi-asset framework. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the notation 
and the hypotheses, which are common for both settings. Section 3 introduces the 
characteristics of the integrated mechanism. It states the unique linear equilibrium and 
derives some market indicators associated with it. Section 4 performs the same analysis for 
the segmented setup. Section 5 compares the market indicators of both mechanisms. 
Concluding comments are presented in Section 6. Finally, an extensive proof is included 
in the Appendix. 
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2. The common framework 
We establish the following notation: if D is a N x N matrix, then (Dt will be its 
nth row and (Dt,n' will denote its (n,n') element, for any n,n' E {l, ... , N}. If D is a 
symmetric positive definite matrix, then DII2 will mean the unique symmetric positive 
definite square root of D.l The superscript T either on a vector or on a matrix will denote 
its transpose. 
Consider a financial market with N securities. Let v be the payoff vector, 
v = (VI"'" V N ) T , which has a multivariate normally (MN) distribution with mean vector v 
and a nonsingular variance matrix Lv' Three kinds of agents participate in the market: 
noise traders, informed investors and market makers. Noise traders demand a vector of 
random, inelastic quantities, not based on maximizing behavior, denoted by 
Z = (Z; "",ZN f, which is MN(Z,L z )' where L z is nonsingular. 
There are K risk-neutral informed investors, indexed by k. These agents possess 
private information about the payoff vector. Let Sk represent the vector of signals received 
by insider k and let ~ k denote his informational advantage, defined as ~ k = E( vlsk ) - v, 
which is MN (6, L q), where 0 denotes the zero vector and the variance matrix L q is 
nonsingular.2 In addition, we assume that for any k,j E {l, ... ,K}, with k::j; j, 
I DII2 = EAII2 ET, where AII2 is a diagonal matrix with the positive square roots of the eigenvalues of D in the diagonal, 
and E is an orthogonal matrix, whose columns are eigenvectors of D [see Bellman (1970)]. 
2 As in Caballe and Krishnan (1994), and in contrast to Bossaerts (1993), instead of using the signals received by insiders, 
we perform the analysis with the informational advantages, since in this way we allow the dimension of the space of signals 
not to coincide with the number of securities of the market. 
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COV(~k' ~j ) = Le' where Le is symmetric and positive definite. The random vectors v, 
~1 , ••• , ~ K are assumed to be independent of z . 
Market makers are risk-neutral and set the prices of the securities they trade, after 
observing their information set. We assume competition among market makers, so that 
this forces them to choose prices such that they earn zero expected profits. 
3. The integrated mechanism 
The framework of this section is the one proposed by Caballe and Krishnan (1994). 
Let xk = x k (~k) be the demand of insider k, which is a N-dimensional random vector. In 
this setup we suppose that market makers are able to observe the order flows of all the 
assets. Thus, the zero expected profits condition implies that the price vector J5 satisfies 
J5 = p(m) = E(vlaJ), a.s., [1] 
K 
where m = L xk + z is the vector of order flows. 
k=l 
Definition 3.1. An equilibrium is a vector of strategies x = ((XI (~I ))T , ... ,(X K(~K ))T) T and 
a price vector p = p(m) such that 
1) for any k E {1, ... ,K} and for any alternative vector of strategies x' differing from x 
only in the kth component, it holds that 
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2) P satisfies [I]. 
For the sake of tractability, we will focus on linear equilibria. Caballe and Krishnan 
(1994) provide the explicit characterization of the unique linear equilibrium in this setup, 
which is stated in the following result: 
Proposition 3.1. There exists a unique linear equilibrium defined as follows: 
where 
A = 2:-112 MII2 2:-112 and B = _I_A-I(I + (K -I) 2: 2:-1)-1 with 
Z Z JK 2 Cq , 
M = 2: 112 G2: 112 and Z Z 
Next, we are interested in analyzing some indicators of the performance of the 
financial market such as the volatility of the price vector and the revelation of information 
through it. The following result provides a property of the equilibrium price vector, which 
facilitates the computation of the mentioned market indicators. 
Corollary 3.2. var(p) = cov(v,p). 
Proof It is easy to see that cov(v,p) = cov(v - p,p) + var(p). Hence, all we need to 
prove is that cov(v - p,p) = O. However, notice that [1] and the projection theorem [see, 
for instance, Gourieroux and Monfort (1989)] provide the last equality. • 
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Corollary 3.3. The volatility of j5 , measured by its variance matrix, is given by 
Proof Using corollary 3.2, the expression of j5 stated in proposition 3.1 and doing some 
algebra, the desired result is obtained. • 
Corollary 3.4. The informativeness ofthe price vector Jp, measured by Lv -var(vlp), is 
.re( 2L~1 +(K -1) L~l Le L~l)-\ 
Proof From the normality assumption, we know that Jp = cov(v,p)(var(p)fl cov(p, v) , 
and using corollary 3.2, we get 
Ip = var(j5). [3] 
Finally, applying corollary 3.3, the desired result is obtained. • 
4. The segmented mechanism 
The setting of this section is related to the one chosen by Bossaerts (1993). The 
superscript S refers to the segmented mechanism. In this framework market makers' quotes 
can depend only on the order flow of their own market. Using the zero expected profits 
condition, we obtain that, for any n E {I, ... , N}, the selected price of the nth security 
satisfies 
K 
where tu; = 2: :t':n + 2'n is the order flow corresponding to the nth security. 
k=l 
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[4] 
Definition 4.1. An equilibrium is a vector of strategies xS = ((xf (~)y , ... , (x; (~K )y) and 
I) for any k E {I, ... ,K} and for any alternative vector of strategies x,s differing from X S 
only in the kth component, it holds that 
2) for all nE {1, ... ,N}, the nth component of ps satisfies [4]. 
Remark 4.1. Notice that the previous definition coincides with definition 3.1, except in the 
fact that now the price of an asset is contingent only in its own order flow. 
The following result finds the unique linear equilibrium in closed form. 
Proposition 4.1. There exists a unique linear equilibrium defined as follows: 
where AS is a N x N diagonal matrix, with 
Proof See Appendix. • 
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It is important to point out that only the diagonal of Iz is relevant in the 
equilibrium coefficients that we have just derived. This property follows from the fact that 
market makers cannot take into account the interactions between different components of 
the vector of demands of noise traders. Next, we derive the corresponding market 
indicators in the segmented mechanism. 
Corollary 4.2. For any n E{l, ... ,N}, var(p;)=cov(lYn,p;). 
Proof It is left since it is very similar to the proof of corollary 3.2. • 
Corollary 4.3. The volatility of pS, given by var(ps), is the following matrix 
K[(I + (K -1) I I-I)-l(I +(K -l)I )(1 + (K -1) I-I I )-1 + H] 
4 2 c~ ~ c 2 ~ c ' 
where His a N x N matrix with its element (n,n') given by the following expression: 
Proof Using the expression of pS stated in proposition 4.1 and doing straightforward 
computations, the result is obtained. • 
Corollary 4.4. The informativeness of the price vector I! is given by 
Proof From the normality assumption, we get that 
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Taking into the last expression, corollary 4.3 and the formula of pS given in proposition 
4.1, and doing some algebra, the desired result follows. • 
Remark 4.2. In contrast to the integrated setting, in the segmented one we cannot ensure 
that I! and var{ps) coincide. Observe that corollary 3.2 was crucial in the derivation of 
[3]. However, in the segmented setup we do not obtain such a strong result, since corollary 
4.2 only guarantees that the diagonals of cov{lY, pS) and var{ps) are equal. 
5. Comparison 
Before comparing the volatility and the informativeness of prices, we show the 
following result, which will be crucial to prove corollaries 5.2 and 5.3. 
Corollary 5.1. cov(lY,p) = cov{lY,ps). 
Proof From propositions 3.1 and 4.1, we get that the parts of p and pS which are 
correlated with v coincide. Therefore, the result is obtained. • 
The next corollary states that the volatility of each price is the same in both settings. 
Corollary 5.2. For any n E{I, ... ,N}, var(PJ=var(p,n. 
Proof It immediately follows from corollaries 3.2, 4.2 and 5.1. • 
Concerning the revelation of information about the payoff of an asset through a 
price, the next corollary says that the informativeness of a price about the payoff of a 
security is the same in both market structures. 
Corollary 5.3. For any n,n' E {l, ... ,N}, 
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() ( I ) () f I s) (cov(V'n"pJY Lv n',n' - var V'n' Pn = Lv n',n' - var\V'n' Pn = (~ ) 
var JJn 
Proof It is easy to see that the normality assumption and corollaries 5.1 and 5.2 provide 
the previous two equalities. • 
Next, we will compare the volatility and the informativeness of the two price 
vectors. Concerning the first market indicator, note that corollary 5.2 tells us that var(p) 
and var(ps) have the same diagonal. However, in general we cannot ensure that these two 
matrices are identical. For instance, observe that the formula of var(p) is independent of 
L
z
' while the expression of var(ps) may depend on it. On the other hand, the next 
corollary shows that pS is more informative about the payoff of an asset than p, This 
result follows from the combination of: i) p is as informative about Vn as Pn' ii) Corollary 
5.3 and, iii) the fact that the revelation of information through p; is smaller or equal than 
Corollary 5.4. For any n E {I, ... , N} , (/:) ~ (/ p) . 
n,n n,n 
Proof Fix nE {I, ... , N}. From [3] we know that (Ip t,n = var(Pn)' Combining 
corollaries 3.2 and 5.3, we can rewrite (/pt.n = (LJn,n -var(V'nlp;). Furthermore, since 
Finally, we compare the expected profits for an arbitrary informed investor obtained 
in both market structures, denoted by E(n) and E(ns), respectively. The next result 
provides that insiders are better off in the segmented mechanism. 
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Corollary 5.5. E{n s ) ~ E(n). 
Proof In order to show this result, it suffices to prove that El(v- - pS r '2' J s E[(V' - P Y '2'] 
because we are in two zero-sum games and the market makers' expected profits are zero. 
Notice that since E(p) = E{pS ) = v and the fact that v and Z are independent, the last 
N N 
inequality is equivalent to - L cov{p; ,'2'n ) S - L cov{p n ,'2'n ), which will be claimed by 
n=l 
proving that cov(p; ,'2'J~ cov(Pn,'2'n), for any nE {1, ... ,N}. Note that, from the 
expression of ps given in proposition 4.1, it follows that 
which can be expressed as 
[5] 
From propositions 3.1, 4.1 and corollary 5.2, it follows that var((As)n'2')=var((At'2'). 
from proposition 3.1, we have that Cov(Pn,Zn) = '; cov((Atz,zn)' Finally, comparing 
the last two expressions, one concludes that cov(p; , '2'n ) ~ cov{p n , '2'n ) . • 
Dennert (1993) argues that in relation to the welfare conclusion in a dealer market, 
one should be concerned to the welfare of noise traders, since these agents are the ones that 
do not have any private information and they trade for liquidity reasons. Thus, from 
corollary 5.5, we can ensure that if we only care about risk-neutral noise traders, then a 
11 
stock exchange deciding to organize a dealer market should implement the mechanism that 
leads to an integrated financial market. 
6. Conclusions 
The objetive of this paper has been the comparison between two trading 
mechanisms in a dealer market, based in two distinct multi-security extensions of the 
Kyle's (1985) framework purposed by Caballe and Krishnan (1994) and Bossaerts (1993). 
The main conclusion to which this analysis leads is that insiders can use the lack of 
transparency of the segmented mechanism to exploit their private information. On the one 
hand, this implies that insiders are better off in the segmented mechanism. On the other 
hand, this makes the vector of order flows (or, equivalently, the vector of prices) 
corresponding to the segmented trading mechanism to be more informative about the 
payoff of an asset than the corresponding to the integrated one. 
Appendix 
Proof of proposition 4.1. Notice that since we consider linear equilibria, we can write 
[AI] 
where A.g and C: are N-dimensional vectors and A1s and B: are N x N matrices, such 
that A; is a diagonal matrix. 
First, we consider the informed traders' decisions. By virtue of [AI], the quantities 
chosen by the kth insider -X; solves the following optimization problem: 
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1 I1 
The first order condition of this problem is 
E(\YI;k )- A; - A)s z - A)s L C] - A)s LlB] E(;j I;k )J = 2A)S x; [A2] i'"k j*k 
and its second order condition implies the positive semidefiniteness of AIs . Using the 
assumptions of the informational advantages of insiders, we have that E(vl~k) = ~k + 17 
and E(~jl~k) = Le L~I ~k' for all j::t k. Plugging the last two expressions into [A2], 
using the linearity assumption conformably with [A 1] and operating, we get 
K 
AISC% =v-A; -A)sz -AIsLC; and [A3] 
h=1 
[A4] 
In particular, observe that [A4] provides the nonsingularity of A1s . 
Now, we will show that a linear equilibrium has to be symmetric in the strategies of 
insiders. Fix k,k'e{l, ... ,K}, with k::tk'. Since [A3] and [A4] are satisfied for all 
k e {1, ... ,K} , we have 
K 
A1sC; =v-A; -A1sz-ArIC; and [A3'] 
h=1 
[A4'] 
Note that [A3], [A3'] and the nonsingularity of A1s imply that 
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[AS] 
On the other hand, using [A4], [A4'] and the nonsingularity of A1s , we get 
2B: + L BJ Le L~I = 2B;' + L BJ 2:e 2:~1 , 
i'l'k i'l'k' 
Simplifying this expression and rearranging the resulting equation, we have 
[A6] 
However, it easy to see that var(~ k - ~ j ) = 2( L ~ - Le), with j"* k, which provides that 
L ~ - Le is positive semidefmite, This implies that 2 L ~ - Le is positive definite, and 
hence, we get that 21 - Le L~l is nonsingular. Consequently, from [A6], it follows that 
B; = B;', Since both [AS] and the last equality hold for any k, k' E {I, ... , K} , with k "* k' , 
[AI] can be expressed as 
[A7] 
Hence, [A3] and [A4] can be written as 
[A8] 
and At BS ( 21 + (K -1) Le L~ 1) = 1. Moreover, since A1s is nonsingular, we can solve 
the last equation for BS as 
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We next detennine the fonnuIa of p;, for any nE {I, ... , N} . Notice that 
K 
m; = KC; + (B s t L ~j + zn' which is nonnally distributed. Computing E{1T
n 
Im; ), 
}=1 
substituting the resulting fonnula into [4] and equating coefficients according to [A7], we 
get 
and [AID] 
[All] 
It remains to solve the system of equations fonned by [AS]-[All]. Plugging [A9] 
into [AIO] and perfonning some algebra in the resulting equation, taking into account [2], 
we get that (Lz )n.n ((A( t,n Y = ~ (G t,n' The positive definiteness of L z' G and A1S allows 
us to solve the last equality for (~s) as 
n.n 
[AI2] 
Combining [AS] and [All], we obtain that (A1S )n.n C; = O. Therefore, C; = O. Hence, 
[All] provides that A;'n = vn - (A1S t.n zn' Taking into account that the last two equalities 
are satisfied for any n E {I, ... , N}, [A 7] provides that pS = v + A1S (ms - z) and 
x; = BS~k' for all k. Finally, using [A9], [AI2] and the previous two fonnulae, we obtain 
the desired expressions. • 
15 
References 
Admati, A. and P. Pfleiderer (1991). « Sunshine Trading and Financial Market 
Equilibrium». Review of Financial Studies 4, 443-481. 
Bellman, R. (1970). Introduction to Matrix Analysis. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Biais, B. (1993). «Price Formation and Equilibrium Liquidity in Fragmented and 
Centralized Markets». Journal of Finance 48, 157-185. 
Bossaerts, P. (1993). «Transaction Prices when Insiders Trade Portfolios». Finance 14,43-
60. 
Caballe, J. and M. Krishnan (1994). «Imperfect Competition in a Multi-security Market 
with Risk Neutrality». Econometrica 62, 695-704. 
Dennert, J. (1993). «Price Competition between Market Makers». Review of Economic 
Studies 60, 735-751. 
Fishman, M. 1. and F. Longstaff (1992). «Dual Trading in Futures Markets». Journal of 
Finance 47, 643-671. 
Gourieroux, C. and A. Monfort (1989). Statistique et Modeles Econometriques. Paris: 
Economica. 
Kyle, A. S. (1985). «Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading». Econometrica 53, 1315-
l335. 
Madhavan, A. (1992). «Trading Mechanisms in Securities Markets». Journal of Finance 
47,2,607-641. 
O'Hara, M. (1995). Market Microstructure Theory. Cambridge: Blackwell. 
16 
, 11 
Pagano, M. and A. Roell (1996). «Transparency and Liquidity: A Comparison of Auction 
and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading». Journal of Finance 51, 2, 579-611. 
Roell, A. (1990). «Dual-capacity Trading and the Quality of the Market». Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 1, 105-124. 
17 
